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According to the US media, last week represented a type of nadir in the fortunes of the Nicaraguan
contras. United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) leader Arturo Cruz, finally resigned after several
weeks of threatening to do so. Some congress- persons and members of the Reagan administration
were apparently taken by surprise. At the same time, detailed reports of contra attacks on civilians
were issuing forth from the pens of US and European journalists. Next, the House voted to suspend
further aid to the contras for a six-month period until the White House accounts for all US monies
provided for the contras thus far. Simultaneous to the House vote, Secretary of State George Shultz
told a congressional committee that State had no idea of what happened to the $10 million solicited
from the Sultan of Brunei. Finally, the Senate voted 97 to 1 in support of a Central American peace
plan developed by the government of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. As expected, Elliott
Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, insisted the administration's
Central America policy was not in trouble, despite all the negative signals. Abrams told reporters,
"You don't come to me for pessimistic views. If this is the worst off we're going to be, we don't have
very far to come back." Other administration officials are not quite so sanguine about Reagan's
prospects for "staying the course" vis-a-vis the contras. Apparently, they believe that the tables
have been turned on the Reagan administration to the effect that the focus has been shifted from an
attack against the Sandinista government in Managua to defending the integrity of the contras. One
official quoted in the NEW YORK TIMES (03/15/87), said, "We've fallen into a situation where we're
reduced to defending them against charges that they are murderers, thugs, thieves and human
rights violators. US interests have gotten lost in the process." Critics of the administration's Central
America policy argue instead that US objectives in the region have never been clear. Thus, the
present wave of scandals and questioning regarding contra activities and spending practices is
merely the culmination of an ill-defined policy, a confusion of strategy with ideology. Washington
has used a variety of arguments to justify its Central America in the past six years. First, Washington
claimed the objective of US intervention in the region was to stop arms shipments from Nicaragua
to the Salvadoran rebels. In 1983, the emphasis shifted to forcing the Sandinistas to accepting a
"peaceful settlement." Then in 1984, President Reagan told the Senate the US "does not seek to
destabilize or overthrow the government of Nicaragua," while contra leaders were saying that their
goal was precisely the removal of the Sandinistas from Managua. Now the administration says
it wants "democracy" in Nicaragua. Last week, Abrams publicly stated that democracy could be
achieved by "pressuring" the Sandinistas into a compromise through negotiations, or by forcing
them out of power. The contras, of course, are necessary tools for either option. Current public
support according to a NEW YORK TIMES-CBS poll indicates that about 28% of adult Americans
are agreeable to continued US support of the contras. According to Stephen Kinzer of the NEW
YORK TIMES (03/15/87), the Nicaraguan contras are their own worst enemies. He points out that
the only prospects for good news in the near future would come from the battlefield rather than
Washington. Contra leaders continue bickering, and some contra field units apparently cannot
refrain from shooting civilians. The contra army has not achieved a significant military victory
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for over two years, and they are aware they must demonstrate their abilities very soon in order to
change the tide of opinion in Washington. Since the beginning of the year the contras have begun
infiltrating into Nicaragua. They are reportedly concentrated in the central region of the country,
and military activity in and around Chontales province is expected to increase. Chontales residents
have aired anti-Sandinista sentiments for some time. Meanwhile, because the contras have persisted
in attacking civilian targets, some people in this area have turned against them. Next, Kinzer states
that "some diplomats" detect a new sense of confidence among Nicaraguan leaders. One South
American ambassador said, "They don't say it outright, but for the first time, some of them are
starting to think they've made it through. They think the war is now coming to the point of being
won. Of course, there is more fighting to come, but they are thinking that they only have to make it
through a year and some months, and they will have survived Reagan." The TIMES correspondent
then declares that the contras have certain advantages, i.e., they are better armed than at any
previous time, their troops inside Nicaragua are being airlifted supplied, and they have inflicted
serious casualties on some Sandinista units. Meanwhile, the country is in dire economic straits,
shortages of foodstuffs are common, and people are dissatisfied. Kinzer closes by stating that if the
contras hope to recapture some of their earlier supporters in Washington, they must not only fight
more, but also differently.
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